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This essay explores the redistribution of expressive agency 
across human artists and non-human entities that inevitably 
occurs when artificial intelligence (AI) becomes involved in 
creative processes. In doing so, my focus is not on a 'becoming-
creative' of AI in an anthropocentric sense of the term. Rather, 
my central argument is as follows: if AI systems will be (or 
already are) capable of generating outputs that can satisfy 
requirements by which creativity is currently being evaluated, 
validated, and valorised, then there is a potential for AI to 
disturb prevailing aesthetic and ontological assumptions 
concerning anthropocentrically framed ideals of the artist figure, 
the work of art, and the idea of creativity as such. I will 
elaborate this argument by way of a close reading of Generative 
Adversarial Network (GAN) technology and its uses in AI art 
(discussing the work of Helen Sarin and Anna Ridler, among 
others), alongside examples of ownership claims and disputes 
involving GAN-style AI art. Overall, this discussion links to 
cultural theories of AI, relevant legal theory, and posthumanist 
thought. It is across these contexts that I will reframe GAN 
systems, even when their 'artistic' outputs can be interpreted 
with reference to the original creations of the singular author 
figure, as 'Generative Adversarial Copy Machines'. Ultimately, I 
want to propose that the disturbances effected by AI in artistic 
practices can pose a critical challenge to the integrity of cultural 
ownership models – specifically, intellectual property (IP) 






Against the background of dramatically increasing interest in 
digital art practices that utilise artificial intelligence (AI), this 
essay explores the redistribution of expressive agency across 
human artists and non-human entities that inevitably occurs 
when AI becomes involved in creative processes.
1
 I pursue this 
focus along the following trajectory: if AI systems will be (or 
already are) capable of generating outputs that satisfy (or appear 
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evaluated, validated, and valorised, then there is also a potential 
for expressive AI to disturb aesthetic and ontological 
assumptions concerning anthropocentrically framed ideals of the 
artist figure, the work of art, and the idea of creativity as such. I 
will unpack this proposition alongside a close reading of 
Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) technology and its uses 
in AI art (touching on the work of Helen Sarin and Anna Ridler, 
among others), and by way of considering some examples of 
informal ownership disputes involving GAN-style AI art. 
Discussing these issues in relation to cultural theories of AI, 
relevant aspects of legal theory, and posthumanist thought, I will 
argue that even when the 'artistic' outputs of GAN systems are 
interpreted in explicit or implied reliance on the concept of the 
singular author figure, such systems are best understood as what 
I will call 'Generative Adversarial Copy Machines'. Ultimately, I 
want to propose that the disturbances effected by AI in creative 
practices can pose a critical challenge to the integrity of cultural 
ownership models – specifically, intellectual property (IP) 
enclosures – that rely on an anthropocentric conceptualisation of 
authorship. 
 
When, in late 2018, Christie's and the French collective Obvious 
auctioned off the AI-generated artwork Portrait of Edmond 
Belamy for the sum of USD 432,500 (Christie's, 2018), some 
commentary from the mainstream press and art critics suggested 
that a new era of creative AI was in the process of emerging, 
and that this might have the potential to disrupt the art world as 
we know it (e.g., Shaw, 2018; Saltz, 2018; Pepi, 2018). Some 
recent publications on AI art situated at the intersections 
between computer science, art history, and popular science are 
pushing in the same direction, and elaborate effusively on a 
coming moment when AI will match and exceed what human 
artists are capable of (e.g., Miller, 2019; Sautoy, 2019). In my 
own view, claims that AI art is evidence of a radical kind of 
becoming-creative of artificial intelligence are vastly overblown. 
As Aaron Hertzmann, among many others, has pointed out, 
'there is always a human behind the artwork' (Hertzmann 2018: 
13; Manovich, 2019; Mazzone and Elgammal, 2019). The AI 
artist Robbie Barrat made the same point when he objected that 
the Obvious collective, in producing Portrait of Edmond 
Belamy, had, in effect, copied some of his own software code 
and data (Bailey, 2018). Challenging the spectacular claim that 
Portrait had been 'created by an algorithm' (Christie's, 2018b), 
Barrat highlighted numerous ways in which human agents are 
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include designing and setting up machine learning networks; 
compiling and/or labelling the training data on which such 
systems are trained; deciding the criteria for 'successful' outputs; 
making determinations regarding the continuation/termination of 
the iterative learning/output process; and curating the resulting 
outputs (Bailey, 2018). Nevertheless, in the popular imagination, 
art projects and design tools that draw on more or less 
sophisticated AI technologies continue to deliver compelling 
examples of presumptively creative AI. 
 
As Joanna Zylinska (2020) has suggested, to ask whether AI can 
be creative is a misguided question. I agree with this sentiment, 
and would also want to emphasise the importance of exploring 
why and how it is that AI can so compellingly appear to be 
creative. Certainly, there are many examples of AI art that can 
be argued to satisfy existing definitions of what makes an artful 
creative expression – but importantly, the underlying definitions 
of creativity tend to be framed anthropocentrically, and many 
examples of 'creative AI' are interpreted in this way precisely 
because of how closely they approximate anthropocentric views 
on creativity. This has important critical implications for the 
aesthetic, socio-economic, and legal status of the work of art and 
its author. Undoubtedly, AI is interfacing with art and creative 
expression in impactful ways: rapidly growing numbers of 
topical exhibitions indicate that AI is leaving its mark on the 
contemporary art world; in mainstream contexts, AI 
recommendation algorithms shape ever more powerfully how 
popular culture is produced and consumed; and AI-based rights 
management tools (such as YouTube's Content ID) are 
becoming increasingly important for controlling the circulation 
of digital culture, and for enforcing the intellectual property 
enclosures that characterise the broader digital landscape of 
creative expression. In all of these areas, AI is presumably 
deployed in service of the production, circulation, or 
safeguarding of anthropocentrically framed creativity. 
Importantly, in all of these contexts, AI also has the potential to 
reshape the aesthetic, cultural, and socio-economic valences of 
the concept of creativity as such. 
 
In what follows, I want to explore this proposition in relation to 
GAN systems capable of outputting image-based content that 
can evoke AI as creative, inspired, and artistic. Again, I want to 
emphasise that I do so not in order to suggest that AI is in the 
process of becoming creative (I don't believe that it is). Rather, I 
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creative AI as an excellent opportunity to begin rethinking what 
it might actually mean, in the age of AI, to create something, 
and by implication what it therefore now means to 'author' a 
creative expression. Links between creativity and authorship 
may appear plainly obvious, but they are critically important, 
since in prevailing humanist frameworks authorship also 
continues to be a key marker of authorial agency and ownership. 
When AI is posited as potentially or actually creative, this 
therefore entails the possibility of a disruption of conventional 
notions both of authorship and of conventional ownership 
models. AI, in this sense, can destabilise the romantic author 
figure, and with it the concept of the unified human agent who, 
by enacting the role of author, can claim ownership of their 
expression. 
 
It may be objected that what I am here invoking as the concept 
of the romantic author figure – i.e., the singular human agent 
whose spirited genius is assumed to make possible the creation 
of unique and original works of art – has long ceased to 
characterise current discourse on art-making and creativity. 
Against this objection, I would argue that even if this notion no 
longer has a particularly strong foothold in cultural and social 
theories of art, it certainly continues to structure the ways in 
which creative expression circulates in the broader cultural 
landscape, specifically through socio-economic and legal 
mechanisms that evaluate, validate, and valorise creative 
expressions by linking them to authors. This, in a nutshell, is the 
cultural logic of intellectual property (IP). Legal theorists and 
philosophers have long used the notion of the romantic author 
figure to critique this logic, and have argued that the notion 
persists because it offers convenient (though problematic) 
justifications for restrictive property enclosures such as 
copyright law (see Jaszi, 1991; Rose, 1995; Drahos, 1996; 
Coombe, 1998, among many others). The romantic notion of the 
author figure therefore continues to be reproduced in the 
prevailing rhetoric that rationalises restrictive legal and 
economic policies of singular authorship and ownership. When, 
in the given context of my discussion, AI art carries the 'external 
hallmarks of human creativity', then the rhetoric of the romantic 
author may be 'seen racing into action – as it has, historically – 
in service of economic interests and the continued expansion of 
copyright's domain' (Craig & Kerry, 2021: 73). As I will argue, 
it is exactly this convenient connection between a creative 
expression and a presumptive author/owner figure that AI, 
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The specific operational logic of GAN systems plays an 
important role in my attempt to begin formulating a response to 
these issues. GAN systems conventionally consist of at least two 
discrete neural networks, which are usually described as 
'Generator' and 'Discriminator'. In the iterative training 
processes that characterise such systems, these discrete units can 
be understood to function as 'adversaries' – one produces 
outputs, the other compares them to a training dataset and 
validates or rejects them. This iterative back-and-forth is 
commonly described as a competition, in which the Generator 
attempts to convince the Discriminator that its outputs are 'real'. 
In the context of creative expression, this logic would 
characterise the Generator as a kind of art forger trying to trick 
an art expert into accepting a masterfully executed 'fake' as 'real', 
or a 'copy' as an 'original'. A more in-depth discussion of this 
process with a focus on GAN usage as a cultural technique will 
lead me to describe GANs as 'Generative Adversarial Copy 
Machines' – computational entities that are, as I want to argue, 
capable of simultaneously satisfying and contradicting romantic 
ideals of creativity and originality based on which GAN outputs 
may be interpreted as artistic. After reframing GANs in this 
way, ultimately I want to suggest that because the ideals 
undermined by GANs also underpin contemporary IP models, 
AI itself, when it figures into digital creative practices, can 
become a critical tool for developing forms of creative 
expression that no longer align with the cultural logic of 
intellectual property, but which instead turn against it. 
 
 
ii. AI Tools and Human Authorship 
 
In 2019, a controversy surrounding the online platform 
GANBreeder, and vague allegations of copyright infringement, 
briefly captured the attention of AI art communities. 
GANBreeder (the tool has since then been rebranded as 
ArtBreeder) was created by Joel Simon, a digital artist with a 
computer science background. The platform is designed as an 
easy-to-use creative tool that gives non-specialist users access to 
sophisticated GAN-based image synthesis. Access to the basic 
functionality is free, and users can also freely share their 
creations, which remain on the platform as source material for 
further creations by others. The controversy involved two artists 
using GANBreeder, Danielle Baskin and Alexander Reben, with 
the former accusing the latter of having misappropriated her 
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without her permission. The informal dispute between Baskin 
and Reben hinged on the fact that the platform did not make 
information concerning the provenance of platform-generated 
images easily available to users, with the result that it was not 
always clear who had created what, and who would therefore be 
in a position to control uses of the generated images. As I 
interpret the controversy, the involvement of GAN-based 
machine learning in the users' creative processes played a 
significant role in blurring the lines between human authorship 
and AI-generated outputs, and consequently also in leading 
users to have flawed assumptions regarding their own role in the 
process, as well as regarding moral and legal entitlements that 
can be derived from that role. In other words, there was a 
significant misunderstanding between Reben and Baskin 
regarding who had (or had not) authored the images in 
contention. 
 
At the time when the controversy flared up, Reben was running 
a commercial art project called amalGAN, which involved 
image generation on GANBreeder, a complicated image-
selection process, and, finally, the commissioning of canvas-
based paintings of chosen images, with that labour being 
outsourced to anonymous Chinese artisans (Reben, n.d.). When 
Reben began to promote his work on social media, several 
GANBreeder users recognised their own AI-generated creations 
in Reben's commissioned paintings. Among them was the artist 
and entrepreneur Danielle Baskin, who was running her own art 
business, GANvas, which allowed clients to order high-detail 
physical prints of images she created using GANBreeder 
(Baskin, n.d.). On social media, Baskin complained about 
Reben's use of some of her creations. In public exchanges and 
press coverage of the controversy, Reben clarified that he had 
not chosen specific images but was instead using a scraper tool 
to download user-generated images from GANBreeder (which 
were then used in the further amalGAN selection process); he 
also noted that he believed the scraped images had been 
generated by an algorithmic system, and were not, in other 
words, human-authored. Baskin, in turn, accused him of copying 
her work without permission or attribution. In the notoriously 
unkind public forum of Twitter, the incident caused Reben to be 
subjected to considerable abuse. The issue was ultimately settled 
when Reben offered to credit Baskin as the original creator of 
the disputed images, and included a statement on his project 
website that clarified his creative process as well as the 
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Jason Bailey, whose excellent digital art blog Artnome featured 
an in-depth discussion of the GANBreeder controversy at the 
time, describes the platform as a custom interface enabling non-
programmers to create images using Google's BigGAN project 
(Bailey, 2019), a state-of-the-art GAN-based image synthesis 
tool originally created by a team around the Google intern 
Andrew Brock (Brock et al., 2019). Simon, the aforementioned 
developer of GANBreeder/ArtBreeder, envisioned the platform 
as a collaboration tool that allows a user not only to create their 
own images, but also to 'breed' new images by having the 
generative algorithms operating in the background of the system 
remix existing source images (or elements thereof), thereby 
rendering new 'children' images. This process also includes 
images previously on the platform, which means that in total, 
GANBreeder/ArtBreeder represents an ecology in which user-
generated content circulates in a free-flowing and not always 
fully transparent fashion, and where outputs created by some 
users also serve as a source for the creations of others. 
 
The platform's current Terms of Use document specifies (as of 
late 2020) that images are owned by the user who creates them, 
but it also dictates that the images are subject to a Creative 
Commons license – specifically the CC0 license (misspelled as 
'CCo' in the document), which means that no rights are reserved. 
This is meant to release all images generated on the platform 
into the public domain, where they can become available for 
further use (both non-commercial and commercial) by others. 
Based on the specified licence, Baskin's complaint cannot be 
considered to have had any legal merit. Technically speaking, 
Reben was within his rights to reuse the images. But it must be 
kept in mind that beyond relevant legal frameworks, authorship 
and cultural ownership issues are always also deliberated on 
non-juridical forums (such as Twitter), and that the ethics of 
copying and the moral economies of creative expression also 
represent an important para-legal domain (see Zeilinger, 2013). 
Additionally, the licensing terms prescribed by the 
GANBreeder/ArtBreeder platform are potentially not the only 
ones that need to be taken into consideration, since both the 
platform itself and Reben's further creative process were making 
use of a long series of inventions, digital tools, and 
computational technologies, all of which are potentially subject 
to their own sets of licenses, contractual agreements, terms of 
use, not to mention shared norms concerning the permissibility 
of specific uses. What emerges is a complex layering of rules, 
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GANBreeder/ArtBreeder authorship questions, which can well 
give rise to contradictory authorship and ownership claims 
concerning images generated on the platform. It is therefore not 
surprising that as an extension of socio-economic perspectives 
on authorship, issues surrounding GAN-style AI art have 
spawned much discussion asking whether an AI system could 
itself be awarded copyright in its creations, and, by extension, 
whether and how an AI system might be technically considered 
as an artist in its own right (e.g., Corin, 2017; Otero & Quintais, 
2018; Bailey, 2019; Vézina & Moran, 2020; Zeilinger 2021). 
 
The disagreement between Reben and Baskin is indicative of 
interesting assumptions concerning the entitlements that are 
broadly assumed to result from having authored/created an 
aesthetic artefact, as well as concerning the uses of aesthetic 
artefacts that are assumed to be permissible when no legitimate 
author/creator appears to exist. Most obviously and 
immediately, these assumptions relate to human creative agency. 
In the GANBreeder controversy, Reben appears to have 
assumed that nobody (specifically, no human artist) had created 
the images that he appropriated and commodified through use of 
his scraper tool. In this view, not only was he unsuspecting 
regarding the involvement of other human users, but he also did 
not perceive the AI system itself as an entity capable of 
possessing authorial/creative agency. Baskin, in turn, saw 
herself as the creator of the images. In this view, the 
computational system used by Baskin was also not assumed to 
have shared in the creative effort in a way that would impact the 
legal status of the resulting work, and the underlying AI system 
was therefore again not perceived as having any authorial 
agency. And yet, for both Reben and Baskin, much of the 
aesthetic as well as commercial appeal of the generated images 
arguably consisted precisely in the fact that they were the 
outputs of presumptively creative AI. 
 
The law, for the most part, cannot currently recognise an AI 
author (e.g., Bridy, 2016; Grimmelmann, 2016; Yu, 2017; Craig 
& Kerr, 2021; all discussed in Zeilinger 2021). The logic 
underlying this perspective hinges considerably on whether (and 
how) expressive entities can be assumed to have agency in the 
activity under consideration: without a certain kind of creative 
agency, one cannot create; without a certain kind of legal 
agency, one cannot own. A problem with this perspective is that 
even new ontologies of authorship that attempt to branch off 
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anthropocentric biases. In other words, questions regarding the 
potential creativity and copyrightability (and thus, ownability) 
of AI-generated outputs tend to be approached by comparing 
these outputs to human-made expressions. Because Reben could 
not discern a conventional (human) author, he may have 
concluded that the images were not 'works' in a sense that would 
render them as artefacts subject to the protection of intellectual 
property rights. If one ignores the fact that even quasi-randomly 
generated images can have authors with legitimate ownership 
claims (e.g., in the form of the humans who wrote the 
underlying generative algorithms), one might assume that the 
GANBreeder images existed in a kind of AI-fed Commons of 
aesthetic artefacts that don't have authors or owners in a 
conventional sense (for a foundational text on Commons, IP 
issues, and digital culture, see Boyle, 2008; also see Zeilinger, 
2021 for a conceptualisation of a posthumanist cultural 
commons in the context of AI art). Out of such a Commons, any 
human artist might then appropriate its contents. By contrast, 
Baskin never considered the images in question to be contained 
in such a Commons, so that their use and subsequent framing as 
someone else's private intellectual property represented the main 
offence. 
 
But between the competing entitlement assumptions of Reben 
and Baskin, there is GANBreeder itself, a minimally agential 
expressive computational entity that could be perceived as more 
or less creative, but which is afforded none of the entitlements 
that such a designation would carry for human authors. If 
nothing else, the use of AI here at least helps to muddy the 
waters of human authorship and creativity. It can destabilise the 
romantic ideal of the centrality and supremacy of the unified, 
singular human agent as author and owner – an ideal that many 
may now perceive as no longer tenable, but which nevertheless 
tends to reappear, as I argued above, whenever disputes over 
authorship and artistic provenance arise. 
 
 
iii. GANs as General Adversarial Copy Machines 
 
The work of Helena Sarin, a well-known AI artist who 
frequently uses GANs, offers a slightly different perspective on 
questions of human creative agency in relation to artificially 
intelligent expressive systems. In a profile of Sarin, Jason Bailey 
(2018b) notes that what distinguishes her work from that of 
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working with pre-trained models, Sarin prefers to train the 
generative systems on datasets that are not only compiled by 
her, but which also contain source materials of her own making. 
As Bailey suggested, this handcrafting of training data can 
protect an artist against the kind of homogeneity and 
predictability of AI art highlighted by theorists and critics 
including Zylinska (2020) and Lev Manovich (2018) (see Pepi, 
2020 for additional context). Arguably, this kind of handcrafting 
serves to reassert the authorial presence of a human artist in a 
non-human system to which 'creative' processes are, to a 
considerable degree, outsourced. For example, the AI artist 
Anna Ridler, who also frequently works with custom-made 
training data, has described her own approach of making and 
using hand-labelled datasets of artist-authored materials to train 
GANs as an artful process that imbues the AI-generated outputs 
with the creative spirit and identity of the artist herself (Ridler, 
2020). Approaches such as Sarin's and Ridler's sidestep the 
'arms race' in which AI artists strive for the implementation of 
ever more high-end tech tools, to the point where their 
generative systems require too much computing power and/or 
data intensity for the artists to be able to train them themselves. 
The result, as Bailey and others have suggested, is that much of 
the generated imagery 'looks the same regardless of who is 
creating it' (Bailey, 2018b), while artist-trained systems, by 
implication, more closely align with familiar perspectives on the 
uniqueness and originality of artworks. 
 
Sarin herself adopts this view when she argues that the 
deliberate choice not to use BigGAN (because it cannot, in 
practice, be trained on artist-authored material) is a constraint 
that can 'boost artistic creativity and inspire the artist to produce 
novel and engaging work' (cit. in Bailey, 2018b). It is interesting 
to note here that Sarin describes her approach as 
'#neuralBricolage', which invokes, of course, artistic practices of 
the improvised reusing of pre-existing materials that may not at 
all be of the artist's own making, while nevertheless 
conventionally resulting in artworks that invoke a singular, 
unified author figure (as important bricoleurs, Sarin references 
Pablo Picasso, Robert Rauschenberg and Frank Stella). But 
when one tries to assign the role of the bricoleur in Sarin's own 
work with GANs, it isn't entirely clear where, in the overall 
creative process, the line must be drawn between the agency that 
supplies the source materials (Sarin) and the agency that 
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more precisely, an agential assemblage that involves both the 
artist and the computational system. 
 
Sarin's technical description of GAN systems (2018) is 
instructive for the way in which she construes the identity of the 
AI artist. Her description borrows heavily from the 
anthropocentric language of artistic mastery and describes GAN 
functionality as a competitive art-making game involving two 
active characters (the 'critic' and the 'apprentice artist') as well as 
a passive character (the 'master'). The goal of the apprentice 
artist, Sarin writes, 'is to generate pictures in the style of her 
master without copying the master's originals', while the goal of 
the critic is 'to decide whether the art he sees is by the apprentice 
or the master'. What sets her description apart from the basic 
description of GAN functionality that I have already offered 
(which involved only two entities, a generator and a 
discriminator) is that Sarin’s model also gives agency to the 
'master', which, in this case, might be presumed to refer to the 
author of the training material. I would interpret Sarin's very 
thoughtful description as implying that the role of the (human) 
AI artist is somewhat distributed across all three agents she 
identifies. In part this is thanks to the fact that this artist figure 
will have authored the training data, but in part also to the fact 
that she serves in the role of what Sarin describes as the 
'curator', i.e., the agent who can tweak functional parameters of 
the GAN system, and who ultimately decides what outputs to 
accept as finished artworks (see also Gover, 2018, who 
discusses the importance of this 'evaluative' moment in the 
context of art authorship). 
 
In the resulting overall system, what Sarin highlights most 
prominently is the artist-created datasets. As she argues, using 
datasets of one's own making will set the results apart from more 
generic AI art working with pre-trained models and 'give 
uniqueness and cohesion' to the results; additionally, as she says, 
there is no 'need to worry about copyright' (Sarin, 2018). Both of 
these points, it would seem to me, are aimed at reasserting the 
creative agency of the human participant in the expressive 
agential human-AI assemblage, and the aesthetic and socio-
economic ownership she can claim over its outputs. This 
emphasises the authorial role of the human AI artist, who is here 
placed in the position of creator of the resulting 'original' 
outputs, with obvious implications in case intellectual property 
counterclaims were to be raised. Notably, the rhetoric of master 
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again the romantic notion of the artist figure that I have invoked 
earlier. 
 
In order to contrast and accentuate this perspective, I now want 
to shift my focus to a rethinking of the internal generative 
processes of GAN systems, before turning my attention back to 
the critical implications of how GAN-style AI art is perceived to 
approximate human-style creativity. In doing so, I will rely 
mainly on a lay description of GAN functionality. While this 
may be well familiar to many readers, the approach is 
nevertheless useful for arguing in more detail how, beyond 
anthropocentric metaphors of spirited machine creativity and 
analogies between human and computational learning processes, 
GAN outputs can be seen to simultaneously imply and 
problematise the unified, singular artist/author figure. As I want 
to argue, GAN technology is in this sense best understood as 
aligned with a progressive (posthumanist) notion of expressive 
agency that contradicts romantic ideals of creativity and 
originality, and which, in doing so, also challenges the cultural 
logic of intellectual property. 
 
As noted in the introduction, GAN refers to a type of artificial 
neural network that can be trained to generate novel content on 
the basis of large datasets. The technology has by now become 
relatively accessible, and its outputs feature elements of 
perceived unpredictability that have made GAN systems an 
ideal playground for practice-based speculations on AI 
creativity. GAN-based image synthesis in particular has been 
found to powerfully evoke human creativity. As already noted, 
GAN systems conventionally consist of two discrete 
computational neural networks that are described as 'Generator' 
and 'Discriminator'. In the iterative training processes that 
characterise GANs, these discrete units are generally understood 
as adversaries – one produces outputs, the other validates or 
rejects them. To train a GAN-based image synthesis system, a 
dataset of appropriate example images is assembled, most 
commonly based on readily available collections or by using 
scraper tools that collect relevant images online. The Generator 
network will then begin to produce image outputs until the set 
goal, i.e., a novel image that satisfies certain criteria (often with 
a focus on similarity to the training set) is reached. Importantly, 
the Generator does not have access to the dataset of pre-existing 
images; it begins its image-creation process without 'knowledge' 
of what the desired output should look like, and relies on the 
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With no information to go on, it can be expected that the 
Generator's first image output will consist of randomly placed 
pixels, which will then be passed to the Discriminator network 
for validation. In contrast to the Generator, the Discriminator 
has access to the training dataset of pre-existing images, against 
which each of the Generator's image outputs is now compared. 
When the Discriminator rejects an output, this evaluation is 
communicated back to the Generator. Depending on the 
configuration of the system, the feedback may consist of a 
simple binary response (accept/reject), but it might also include 
additional information, for example regarding the accuracy of 
colour content, compositional detail, etc. The Generator now 
compares the feedback received with information concerning its 
previous outputs, adjusts its rendering algorithms, and iterates 
its next output, which is again passed for evaluation to the 
Discriminator. And so on. Over a large number of iterations, 
which can reach into hundreds of thousands of repetition-and-
difference cycles, the Generator 'learns' from its mistakes and 
improves its outputs, which will begin to match the training data 
more and more closely, until a threshold of accuracy is reached 
beyond which the Discriminator is no longer able to distinguish 
Generator outputs from the ‘real’ contents of the training 
dataset. At some point, the GAN system as a whole will thus be 
understood to have gained the ability to create, with a 
predictable success rate, images that sit above the threshold of 
what will be accepted, both by the Discriminator and by human 
observers, as part of the image category that makes up the 
training data set. 
 
Significantly, descriptions of GAN functionality often 
characterise the iterative back-and-forth between Generator and 
Discriminator as a competition, a kind of cat-and-mouse game 
in which the Generator attempts to convince the Discriminator 
that its outputs are ‘real’. As discussed, this is reflected in 
Sarin’s description, with its reliance on the imitation-based 
triadic relationship between ‘master’ artist, ‘apprentice artist’, 
and ‘art critic’, and the further complication of the involvement 
of the ‘curator’ figure. The same logic resonates through 
Ridler’s description of GAN functionality (op. cit.), which relies 
on the analogy of ‘art forger’ and ‘detective’ to describe a 
‘dance’ between these two subject positions during which 
‘counterfeits become indistinguishable from the genuine article’. 
Notably, both Sarin’s and Ridler’s discussion of GAN systems 
invoke derivative practices with which many artists may not 
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‘play’, ‘dreaming’, and ‘hallucinating’. I don’t think of such 
seeming contradictions in descriptions of GAN functionality as 
flaws; in my mind, they beautifully express the conceptual 
complexity of GAN technology in its interfacing with human 
creativity in artistic contexts, where the perceived/felt 
redistribution of expressive agency across human and machine 
indeed becomes very tricky to pinpoint. 
 
Descriptions such as the ones just referenced, which tend to 
characterise the Generator as a kind of forger trying to trick an 
art historian into accepting a masterfully executed copy as a 
genuine, align with the logic of the ‘AI art Turing test’ as 
proposed by Manovich (2019). Here, the ‘creativity’ of an AI 
system is meant to be determined by its ability to fool a human 
art critic into erroneously believing that the output under 
consideration was created not by a machine, but by a human 
artist. An immediate issue with this approach is that it 
conceptualises creativity and artfulness in fundamentally 
anthropocentric terms – here, the threshold for AI creativity is 
the ability of artificial intelligence to pass itself off as human. 
What I derive from Manovich's version of the Turing test, as 
well as from Sarin's and Ridler's discussions, is that what GAN-
based expressive machine learning systems represent is in 
essence a new type of highly sophisticated copy machine. This 
perspective can reveal itself as both correct and potentially 
misleading. The logic of GAN descriptions such as those offered 
by Sarin and Ridler – with their emphasis on the Generator unit's 
efforts to imitate the contents of the training dataset to fool the 
Discriminator – is sound. Nevertheless, strictly speaking the 
Generator's outputs can never constitute copies or reproductions 
of anything at all, since, as discussed above, the system does not 
have the kind of direct access to source materials that is implied 
by the anthropocentric analogies of the forger, copyist, or 
apprentice imitator. The Generator, in other words, cannot be 
said to ‘copy’ the training data in any conventionally meaningful 
sense of the term. 
 
Despite the nominally adversarial nature of the interaction 
between Generator and Discriminator, the two discrete units 
work in tandem to form what can be described as a sophisticated 
appropriation machine, capable of approximating style, content, 
and other desired qualities of the training materials. In my mind, 
it is actually thanks to this capability that GANs bear 
resemblance to the creative minds of human agents: not in the 
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unique creative works, but rather in a more progressive sense 
that proposes creativity as fundamentally relational, embedded, 
and dialogic. To turn things on their head a bit, following this 
logic it is entirely feasible to describe human creativity itself by 
borrowing from the conceptual register of technical descriptions 
of machine learning. In such a formulation, creativity could then 
be described as the astonishing ability to generate novel content 
by iterating derivative approximations of pre-existing materials, 
to the point where imitation dissolves into originality. 
 
This characterisation may stand in stark contradiction to 
traditional notions of creative genius, but it does resonate with 
the notion that influence, imitation, mimicry, and copying form 
the core of how human agents acquire language, learn a craft, 
and, indeed, create art (see Boon, 2010 for an elaborate 
rethinking of creativity and originality in relation to copying 
practices). In this sense, it would be wrong to entirely reject 
analogies between GAN-style machine learning and human 
creativity. Ultimately, to recognise the dialogic interactions 
between Generator and Discriminator (or even the 
entanglements between Generator, Discriminator, training data, 
and human ‘curator’) is a good way of re-emphasising the 
relational dimensions of human creativity itself. This means that 
GAN-based generative tools and their outputs inscribe the 
operational logic of machine learning with a notion of creative 
expression that gestures towards posthumanist perspectives, and 
which challenges assumptions of the centrality and supremacy 
of a unified, singular, spirited human artist and their unique 
ability to create original expressions. In this view, GANs, as 
‘Generative Adversarial Copy Machines’, are incompatible with 
any rhetoric framing of creative AI that relies on traditional, 
anthropocentric notions of creativity. 
 
As noted, technically speaking a GAN system iterates over 
training data until it has surpassed the threshold beyond which 
the Generator can convince the Discriminator that its generative 
‘fakes’ are, in fact, ‘real’. GAN ‘creativity’, it follows, works 
within an ontology of originality that is fundamentally anchored 
in repetition. But some current views on AI creativity ignore this 
and instead proceed along a different human-AI analogy. For 
example, in recent publications by du Sautoy (2019) and Miller 
(2019), the yardstick for measuring AI creativity is, once again, 
the art-historical manifestation of the romantic artist figure and 
its creative genius capable of producing original and unique 
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AI-generated artworks of the kind discussed here are better 
described as a new kind of Baudrillardian simulacra, no matter 
how compellingly they might appear to approximate 
anthropocentric norms of creative originality. In other words, 
the iterative entanglements that frame the generative processes 
of a GAN system should be understood to result not in the 
emergence of a new type of non-human-yet-anthropocentrically-
modelled creativity, but instead in the production of copies 
without originals. 
 
To spin this thought further: if GAN outputs (interpreted as 
artworks) constitute copies without originals, then GAN systems 
themselves (viewed as agential assemblages with expressive 
capabilities) resemble bodies without organs. Katherine Hayles 
(1999), Patricia Pisters (in Braidotti and Hlavajova, 2018) and 
others have pointed to the usefulness of this concept, borrowed 
from Antonin Artaud and popularised by Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari, for critiquing the Enlightenment notion of 
autonomous subjectivity. In the given context, I would argue 
that the workings of a GAN system can itself constitute just such 
a critique: the ‘adversarial’ interplay (or intra-action) between 
Generator and Discriminator may appear to project a kind of 
split personality, a simple competitive duality revolving around 
‘copy’ and ‘original’, ‘fake’ and ‘real’; but more importantly, it 
also represents a decentred agential assemblage that will not and 
cannot conform to the conventions by which the unified agency 
of the singular human artist figure has traditionally been 
identified. 
 
A GAN system engaged in presumptively creative processes 
that might be interpreted as capable of yielding novel, unique, 
and original aesthetic artefacts thus also always signals, to use 
Jane Bennet's formulation, ‘wider distributions of agency’ 
across the porous boundaries of the AI system's co-constitutive 
generative elements (2009: 122). These distributions extend 
beyond a GAN system's computational components, and 
surface, in the words of Karen Barad, as 'mutual constitutions of 
entangled agencies' (2007: 33) that integrate computational and 
algorithmic components with their human designers, 
programmers, owners or operators, and likewise with the 
information, biases, and subjectivities expressed in training data 
sets. In this view, the entanglements that characterise GAN-style 
AI art can be seen to result in expressive outputs and behaviours 
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humanist paradigms of creativity, originality, and authorship 





GAN-style AI art is perhaps not quite as dumb, boring, 
predictable, or meaningless as some critics are making it out to 
be. Yes, easy analogies between surprising, novel AI-generated 
outputs and the traditional notion of the unknowable creative 
genius of human artists are shallow and trite. But in any case, as 
I have tried to argue, neither the expressive 'minds' of AI 
systems nor the expressions they are capable of producing are 
ultimately consistent with the romantic model of singular 
expressive agency that AI art is at times meant to invoke. 
Instead, such systems align much more closely with the ways in 
which posthumanist thought conceptualises agency. Here, 
artificially intelligent agential assemblages emerge as decentred 
and relational, rather than as internally unified and singular. 
‘Creativity’ now can no longer be argued to work from the blank 
slate of pure inspiration (as if it ever had); rather, in the ways in 
which it manifests in GAN outputs, it becomes another reminder 
that this blank slate does not, in fact, exist. Operating as 
relational systems with purous boundaries, GANs are embedded 
in cultural and technological ecologies, which they access 
through training data and the subjectivities inscribed in human 
agents who are inevitably implicated and involved in any 
generative process that an AI system may be capable of. 
 
It might be objected that a notion of relationality does not map 
smoothly onto AI. In their recent essay on the (im-)possibility of 
AI authorship, the legal scholars Carys Craig and Ian Kerr note 
that the same characteristics which render authorship relational 
and dialogic also require the recognition of authorship as a 
‘communicative act that is inherently social’, and which is 
marked by a ‘cultivation of selfhood’ (2021: 44) not accessible 
to AI. But approaching the expressive agency of AI through a 
posthumanist framework allows for relational and dialogic 
processes to become decoupled from an anthropocentric focus 
on human-only social and communicative interactions and on 
human-only-made artefacts, so that relationality can persist in 
entanglements that involve both human and non-human agential 
entities. The point of insisting on this distinction is that the 
disaggregated expressive agency of artificial intelligence, when 
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exactly the kind of progressive view on a human creativity of 
the dialogic/situated self through which critics of the romantic 
author figure have long sought to disrupt narrow conceptions of 
authorship and ownership. As Barad notes with regard to the 
specific example of writing, as an expressive activity this 
represents ‘an iterative and mutually constitutive working out, 
and reworking, of “book“ and “author“’ (2007: x). Applied to 
the use of GAN-style AI systems for creative expression, this 
observation can surely be read as suggesting that critical uses of 
AI in artistic practices are capable of achieving something more 
than merely an imitative approximation of human creativity. 
 
In this essay I have tried unpack the operational logic of GAN 
systems in digital art-making contexts to argue that even though 
GAN-style AI art tends to be evaluated based on how effectively 
it embodies the ‘external hallmarks of human creativity’ (Craig 
& Kerr, 2021, op. cit.), it also structurally undermines the 
ontological and conceptual integrity of that idea of creativity. 
This can have serious critical implications not only for the 
aesthetic interpretation of AI art, but also for socio-economic 
perspectives on originality, the AI art author figure, and the 
legal status of the AI artwork itself. How would an informal 
ownership dispute such as the one between Reben and Baskin 
play out if it were more fully acknowledged how severely the 
decentralised agential assemblage out of which GAN creativity 
emerges complicates questions concerning a given output's 
provenance? How would the controversy surrounding Portrait 
of Edmond Belamy have to be reinterpreted in consideration of 
how the functionality of GANs structurally contradicts narrow 
views on anthropocentrically modelled originality, authenticity, 
and authorship? 
 
In Inhuman Power (2019), Nick Dyer-Witheford, Atle M. 
Kjosen and James Steinhoff outlined a rather dark perspective 
on the trajectory of AI. Writing in the broader context of 
Marxist political economy and media theory, the authors 
consider AI as a technology that is fundamentally aligned with 
capital. There is little indication, they argue, that AI automation 
will spell the end of the capitalist exploitation of labour, or that 
an abundance of knowledge and wealth, which AI will 
supposedly soon generate, might enable humanity to live in a 
utopia without work, poverty, inequality, or disease. Instead, 
Dyer-Witheford, Kjosen and Steinhoff express concern that 
without radical intervention, the inhuman power of AI will 
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around. I share much of the critical perspective from which the 
authors are speaking, and agree with their critique of the 
dominant corporate nexus of AI development. Nevertheless, 
within the much narrower context of speculating on the critical 
implications of GAN creativity, I want to suggest a diversion 
from the argument that AI is a fundamentally capitalist 
technology. Where the aesthetics of AI art interface with its 
socio-economic assimilation into property-oriented circuits of 
cultural ownership, could GANs not also be framed as non- or 
anti-capitalist – in the sense that the ‘creativity’ GANs enact 
destabilises traditional authorship models, yielding aesthetic 
artefacts that cannot easily be captured by existing intellectual 
property regimes? 
 
Mario Klingemann, an AI artist well known for his experiments 
with GAN-style machine learning (he received the Lumen Prize 
gold award for The Butcher’s Son in 2018), has been quoted as 
suggesting that humans ‘can only reinvent, make connections 
between things we have seen’, whereas ‘machines can create 
from scratch’ (Miller, 2019b). This statement beautifully 
encapsulates a characterisation of human creativity as dialogic, 
relational, and fundamentally intertextual, but it also appears to 
suggest that computers (as opposed to human artists) are 
somehow capable of autonomous tabula rasa creation. Invoking 
once again the romantic fiction of original genius, this claim 
quite self-contradictorily suggests that while ‘humans are not 
original’, computational systems have the potential to become 
more-than-human artists in a very traditional sense. In 
contradiction to such a claim, my framing of GANs as 
‘Generative Adversarial Copy Machines’ suggests that their 
outputs are derivative in novel ways; that these ways cannot be 
easily grasped or co-opted by established anthropocentrically 
framed systems of evaluating, validating, and valorising 
creativity; and that the ‘creations’ of GANs therefore disturb the 
integrity of the ownership models currently structuring the 





1. The central ideas developed in this essay are elaborated in 
Tactical Entanglements: AI Art, Creative Agency, and the Limits 
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